Chaika (1982) has proposed that what is frequently viewed as a schizophrenic thought disorder should more precisely be regarded as a speech disorder. We suggest, however, that one should emphasize constructs concerning disordered schizophrenic thinking. We support this position since the schizophrenic's strange speech can (it into a larger view about his disordered thinking which is grounded in a nomological net involving various different types of strange behavior. Other support comes from (1) the use of tests assessing disordered nonverbal behavior, (2) evidence that schizophrenics intermingle personal concerns (ideas) into their verbalizations, (3) bizarre schizophrenic behavior, and (4) the very large percent of schizophrenics with delusions. There is an intricate link between language-which includes a system of symbols, words, and meanings-and thinking. Thus, we have proposed that the disturbance most frequently observed in schizophrenic verbalizations be viewed as involving conceptual-linguistic activity, and not just a problem of speech activity. Elaine Chaika's (1982) contribution to "At Issue" entitled "Thought Disorder or Speech Disorder in Schizophrenia" raises several controversial theoretical and empirical issues of importance to the field, and the current discussion was designed to address these. Chaika's main thesis is that what is frequently viewed in the field as a schizophrenic "thought disorder" should more precisely be regarded as a schizophrenic "speech disorder." This issue has been the subject of considerable thought anddiscussion for a number of years.
pointing out the inherent autonomy of the linguistic system and its arbitrary relation to the world. She notes that there is not good evidence that disordered schizophrenic speech is a function of disordered thinking, and she maintains that speech and thought should not automatically be equated. She cites the realms of syntax and phonology as rulegoverned, systematic aspects of language. She, in effect, notes that we often see disordered speech in patients who have adequate underlying thoughts and ideas.
There are, however, aspects of Chaika's overall discussion that present problems and are certainly "at issue." Although many of the ideas she presents are technically accurate statements about language, their application to theory and research on schizophrenic communication disturbance may limit rather than foster progress in this area. There are several major issues that could be valuably reflected upon in relation to the question of whether it is fruitful to regard schizophrenic patients as being thought disordered. The first issue involves the nature of scientific inference and how to maximize progress in solving unanswered questions about psychopathology. The second issue involves a review of whether there is evidence indicating that the schizophrenic patient's speech disorder usually reflects a thought disorder. The third one focuses on issues involved in the relations among speech, language, and thinking. The final issue involves various considerations raised by Chaika concerning the precision of alternate explanations, and concerning whether the simplest explanation (i.e., Occam's razor) Reprint requests should be sent to Dr. M. Harrow, Dept. of Psychiatry, Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, 29th and Ellis Avenue, Chicago, 1L 60616.
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should be used in attempting to understand schizophrenic psychopathology.
The Nature of Scientific Inference: Is Schizophrenic Speech a Sign of Schizophrenic Thinking?
We should note at the outset that we agree with the view that thought and speech should not be equated on a one-to-one basis. Thought and speech are distinct. Speech is an observable behavior, whereas thinking is a theoretical construct. In spite of their distinctness, there remains the question of whether, given appropriate caution, speech and language behavior can be, and even should be, used as evidence about thought processes, particularly for judgments about potential disorders in thought. We believe that to maximize precision by regarding schizophrenic patients' problems in this area as a speech disorder will slow progress in the field. Inferring that schizophrenic patients' speech disorder usually reflects a thought disorder, on the other hand, will facilitate advances in our knowledge about schizophrenia. In addition, there is considerable empirical evidence from diverse sources to support the view of schizophrenic patients' having a thought disorder as opposed to an independent speech disorder, and some of this evidence is discussed below.
The construct of disordered thinking in schizophrenia should be examined using a theoretical model, the nomological net (Cronbach and Meehl 1956) , that can aid our understanding of a complex area. A nomological net refers to an interlocking system of laws or relationships that constitute a theory. The nomological net relates various theoretical constructs and observable events to one another, and can be used as a way of validating a construct or series of constructs (Cronbach and Meehl 1956 ). When we view the disordered speech of the schizophrenic patient in terms of a nomological net involving their disordered thinking, a range of observations in very different areas acquires a certain consistency. In this respect, views about disordered thinking fit in with a diverse range of data (see below), and help us to make better sense of schizophrenic behavior. Such a nomological net, involving constructs about schizophrenia, and related observations about cognition and behavior, can lead to rich hypotheses about how different aspects of schizophrenic psychopathology may or may not be linked. This approach can clear the way toward further productive inquiry about schizophrenia.
Thinking, in general, can be viewed as a construct that describes internal cognitive activity. The field of cognition has not yet discovered all of the rules and component processes involved in thinking, nor is the physiological nature of thinking completely understood. We should, of course, remember that we do not understand all of the details about many of our best constructs or about many readily observable events. Although we strive to be as knowledgeable as possible about our major constructs, they can still be useful and valuable even before we have gained complete understanding of them. One example of a useful construct is intelligence (e.g., highly intelligent people perform better on intellectual tasks than less intelligent people). A second example can be found in the concept of the gene, which was at the level of a construct for many years, until recent advances provided strong evidence for the actual physical existence of genes.
There is very strong evidence for the usefulness of the construct of thinking. This includes overwhelming empirical evidence about many of its products and observable results, as well as the effects of interference with the thinking process.
Evidence That Disordered Schizophrenic Speech Usually Reflects Disordered Schizophrenic Thinking
Chaika is accurate in pointing out that speech and thought are not identical. For most people, however, speech is a good clue to thinking. The question is: Are schizophrenic patients among those people for whom speech is a good clue to thinking? The answer is "yes" in most cases.
There are at least four major lines of evidence to support the position that schizophrenic patients show disorders in thinking and to support the belief that their disturbed speech is often a result of disordered thinking, rather than being a consequence of a disorder only at the level of speech production and encoding.
A first line of evidence that a large number of acute schizophrenic patients show disordered thinking rather than only disordered speech comes from the use of tests in which verbal behavior is not the only factor being investigated, but in which disordered nonverbal behavior also is a focus of study. This can be seen from the use of tasks involving the manipulation of objects or things used in real life situations. One of the major tasks in this area, which has been used successfully by our own research team and by a number of other investigators, is the objectsorting test ( Harrow and Quinlan, in press). In this test, the disordered sortings of objects arid other types of disturbances that are observed are often the result of ideas and thinking by the patient which are strange and inappropriate in that particular task and communicative setting. Thus, the disturbance that is demonstrated by schizophrenic patients on the objectsorting test is typically the result of strange concepts and ideas rather than of only strange words or speech, although the line between strange words and ideas may be a thin one. In addition, our own evidence shows a relatively high correlation (r = .60) between the use of strange ideas and concepts on the object-sorting test and disordered thinking as demonstrated on more purely verbal tests such as the proverbs test (Marengo et al., in press). Thus, some of the underlying factors responsible for the disordered behavior on less verbal tests (e.g., the strange concepts, ideas, and style of thinking that are observed in the schizophrenic patient's object-sorting test performance) may be related to whatever underlying factors are responsible for disordered speech behavior on more verbal tests such as the proverbs test.
A second line of evidence can be found in schizophrenic patients' verbal behavior. An analysis of schizophrenic patients' disordered speech on verbal tests shows that a very frequent form of speech disturbance involves an intermingling of personal material into speech when it does not fit neatly with the external context of the conversation, making the schizophrenic patients' speech seem strange and inappropriate Prosen 1978, 1979; Harrow et al. 1983 ). Since such intermingling usually involves a mixing of ideas related to conflicts and issues of personal concern to the patient into his speech, the disorder here is at the level of ideational relevance or the level associated with thinking, rather than at the level of individual words or parts of speech. As such, it is hard to see how intermingling can be a consequence of only the disordered use of words and sentences independent of thought. The tendency to mix in ideas and thoughts about personal conflicts at the wrong time makes the schizophrenic patient look inappropriate, and appears to be a consequence of disordered thinking. In this case, a closer analysis of the specific type of disordered speech that often characterizes schizophrenic patients' verbal behavior provides further clues about the nature of their disordered speech and supports the view that disordered speech behavior is often a function of disordered thinking 1 A third line of evidence involves the common observation that disordered speech is not the only type of strange behavior displayed by the schizophrenic patient. Thus, many schizophrenic patients do strange things and behave in strange ways. The strange behavior of the same schizophrenic patient who engages in strange speech is part of a larger cluster of behaviors that can be attributed to a more general tendency to think strangely and to entertain strange ideas. If the schizophrenic patient only had strange speech and strange word usage, there would be no reason to expect some schizophrenic patients to engage in strange posturing or other unusual types of behavior. As can be seen, the inference that strange speech suggests strange thinking is not circular since the schizophrenic patient's strange speech can fit into a construct about his disordered thinking that is grounded in a larger nomological net involving various different types of strange behaviors.
Delusions, which often represent strange and inappropriate thinking of a less transitory kind, can also be included in this larger nomological net of strange ideation.
Thus, a fourth point involves the overwhelming evidence that a very large percentage of acute schizophrenic patients have delusions (grossly false ideas about the world that they cling to tenaciously despite evidence to the contrary). Our own research on schizophrenia and that of others have provided evidence that there is a high correlation between the presence of delusional beliefs, which often involve strange, unreal ideas that are presumably related to thinking, and the use of disordered speech, which we also view as related to thinking (Harrow, Silverstein, and Marengo 1983; Harrow and Quinlan, in press). The high correlations between these two phenomena indicate that among patients with schizophrenia, those patients who are most delusional are also the ones who are most likely to show speech disorder, or, in our view, thought disorder.
Boundary Between Speech, Language, and Thinking: Conceptual-Linguistic Activity
The third consideration in regard to Chaika's contention that the diverse peculiarities of the schizophrenic patient's speech behavior are evidence of speech disorder rather than thought disorder involves conceptual issues related to the boundaries separating speech, language, and thinking.
In arguing that the schizophrenic patient's problem is a "speech disorder," Chaika draws most of her examples from the lower phonological and syntactic strata of language. That is, they come from those aspects of language that are SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN most internal to the linguistic system and relatively autonomous of thought. Her views would be more compelling if there were a body of data in the literature corroborating that the disordered verbal behavior of schizophrenic patients frequently involves an impairment in the production of sounds and syntactic rules. However, recent research has provided negative evidence for the concept of "schizophasia" used by Chaika and others (Gerson, Benson, and Frazier 1977; Rochester and Martin 1979; Faber et al. 1983 ). Moreover, the body of empirical evidence does not support the contention that the schizophrenic patient's language behavior is disturbed at the lower levels of language, the levels most frequently affected in aphasia (Maher, McKean, and McLaughlin 1966; Holzman 1978; Johnston and Holzman 1979; Rochester and Martin 1979) .
Chaika asserts that many parts of a language system are system-internal (i.e., part of a language's system of rules and relations, and independent of any other behavioral influence) and can be problematic, independent of the adequacy of thought. We would contend, however, that language in use is usually based on thought. As such, it is highly dependent on thought in a particular social and cognitive situation. In those aspects where language interfaces most incontrovertibly with the world, namely at the. level of semantics (or meaning), and discourse (or conversation), the strong separation between observable language behavior and thought processes becomes much fuzzier and harder to uphold. In addition,-the research of those investigators cited in the previous paragraph, as well as our own (Lanin et al. 1981) , suggests that it is precisely at the level of meaning and the production of sequentially coherent discourse or spontaneous conversation that schizophrenic patients' language behavior begins to deviate from patterns of regular or typical linguistic use, and that it becomes strange and disordered. Chaika herself asserts the importance of assessing schizophrenic patients' spontaneous discourse behavior in order to identify the locus of impairment in verbal behavior (Chaika 1982, p. 590) .
This empirical observation, however, raises a complex theoretical question. When problems in discourse are considered, what should be classified as problems of language and language behavior versus problems of thought that are independent and separate from linguistic expectations? In the consideration of schizophrenic patients' disordered verbalizations, a flexible boundary should be maintained concerning what is considered a problem in thought versus what is considered a problem in language. In one sense, we propose that schizophrenic patients' disordered verbalizations are usually due to disordered thinking and cognition, and when such speech deviation is detected in dialogue with a schizophrenic patient, the hypothesis that thinking or cognition is disordered should be the first to be entertained. From a more comprehensive standpoint, however, in examinations of actual verbal behavior, the two realms-linguistic behavior and thought-are usually inextricably related.
The crux of the issue on language behavior versus thought depends on whether the constructs of meaning and relevance are consigned to the domain of thought or the domain of language. How are sequential thoughts constrained and rules of relevance between thoughts mediated? How do internal concepts routinely link with some concepts but remain typically unrelated and dissociated from other concepts? The view proposed here is that the language system, whose external side is speech, is also, more profoundly, the foundation of much of our internalized system of concepts and their interrelations.
At times, Chaika has assumed a definition of speech that includes the whole of the language system. However, further clarification is needed concerning the use of the terms "language" and "speech." The language system can be viewed as the more permanent and general construct, since it includes the system of symbols, words, and meanings, as well as the network of relations between signs and the concepts they represent, independent of any particular speech act. Thus, language, not speech, is the term typically used as the broader construct, of which speech production is a specific, behavioral part.
The language system, with its intricate pattern of interlocking semantic networks, is the mediating link between communication or verbal behavior expressed through speech, and the internal conceptual activity that we call thought. This role of language is far from superficial. Some might hold that the function of language is merely to supply words. However, instead of serving a simple translation function-translating preverbal thought to speech by providing the word-language is the basis of much of thought because it provides an intricate system of concepts that is the foundation and instrument of conceptual activity.
For the purposes of the present discussion, conceptual-linguistic activity should be distinguished as V0L11.N0. 1, 1985 one component of communicative behavior, and linguistic-speech activity as another. Linguistic-speech activity includes the motoricexpressive side of language involved in the actual production of talk, while conceptual-linguistic activity includes processes involved in the symbolic act, more directly linked to thought. A linguistic-speech dysfunction includes those problems in speech production cited by Chaika and others such as slips of the tongue and momentary errors in word retrieval or sound production. Eric Lenneberg (1973) , a specialist on the neurological basis of language, has argued for a similar distinction.
Because language and thinking are so intricately linked, we propose that the disturbances most frequently observed in schizophrenic verbalizations involve problems in conceptuallinguistic activity; in our view, such disturbances are typically not a consequence of problems solely attributable to the component of linguistic-speech activity. From a theoretical perspective, we believe that in the process of verbal communication, these two aspects of human functioning (i.e., language and thinking) cannot always be usefully separated. A related view has been expressed by Rochester and Martin (1979) .
In support of this nonseparatist position, it can be pointed out that the whole question of thought disturbance versus language disturbance is part of an older and very general controversy concerning thought versus language. We should note, here, the view of Vygotsky, who also confronted the elusive boundary of thought and language. In his classic work Thought and Language, he noted:
meaning is an act of thought in the full sense of the term. But at the same time, meaning is an inalienable part of the word as such, and thus it belongs in the realm of language as much as in the realm of thought. . . . Since word meaning is both thought and speech, we find in it the unit of verbal thought we are looking for. [Vygotsky 1962, p. 5] The primary function of speech is communication, social intercourse. When language was studied through an analysis into elements, this function, too, was dissociated from the intellectual function of speech. The two were treated as though they were separate, if parallel, functions, without attention to their structural and developmental interrelation. Yet word meaning is a unit of both these functions of speech. I Vygotsky 1962, p. 6] Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them. Every thought tends to connect something with something else, to establish a relationship between things. [Vygotsky 1962, p. 125] It is our view that one of the most promising avenues through which knowledge may be advanced about schizophrenic language disturbance is in viewing verbal behavior as the product of interrelated conceptuallinguistic activity. From this perspective, "thought-disordered speech" can be most profitably studied as specifiable deviations from more typical conceptual-linguistic patterns of verbal behavior.
As already mentioned, many recent investigators have contended that the study of discourse behavior is imperative for making further progress in understanding schizophrenic language disturbance. The question is how to interpret the results of discourse-based studies (e.g., Andreasen 1979; Rochester and Martin 1979; Lanin et al. 1981; Harvey 1983 ). When we discover stretches of discourse that show problems in cohesion, should we attribute them simply to a speechlanguage dysfunction independent of, and subsequent to, thought?
One frequent example of discourse behavior which highlights the close meshing of linguistic behavior and thought is provided by cases of intermingled discourse. Intermingling personal concerns into speech often results in verbalizations whose relevance is hard to follow; it also typically involves a problem in adhering to the implicit social standard of sticking to a shared topic for thought and speech. Grice (1979) , for instance, has emphasized his conversational postulate: "Be relevant." Such consensually shared, unconscious guidelines are not simply a function of speech behavior alone, nor are they distinctly in the domain of language or the domain of thought; rather, they are based on a more unified model of language, thought, and discourse.
Based on theories of normal cognition, we suggest that the production of contextually appropriate, goal-oriented, cohesive discourse depends on an implicit knowledge of, and ability to use, linguistic and social rules of relevance and appropriateness (Harrow and Miller 1980) . In order to produce coherent verbal behavior, the autonomous, system-internal aspects of linguistic production must be fully engaged. The cognitive mechanisms of "executive planning" are also crucial to the production of fully coherent, contextualized, and meaningful discourse.
Schizophrenic Speech vs. Schizophrenic Thinking: Other Considerations
Finally we should note that in the controversy over schizophrenic speech disorder vs. schizophrenic thought disorder, Chaika (1982, p. 590 ) discusses Occam's razor, suggesting that the simplest of two explanations be used. This principle (Occam's razor) applies most clearly if two explanations are equally powerful. In the present case, however, the formulation about disordered thinking, or an impairment in conceptual-linguistic activity, is much more powerful and productive. Since data also exist concerning strange, deviant ideas and disordered thinking in schizophrenia, the formulations about disordered speech versus disordered thinking are not equally viable. Thus, there is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that most cases of disordered speech by schizophrenic patients involve underlying ideas that are strange, with the probability that these strange ideas underlie some or much of their strange behavior in other realms.
Chaika also emphasizes that viewing deviant speech without assumptions about disordered thought is more exact. Being exact is not an end in itself or a final goal. We are often interested in phenomena or features of the patient for the larger and more comprehensive view it gives us. Thus, for instance, we are interested in certain behaviors, such as a patient's frown or downturned mouth. However, we are even more interested in this type of behavior (the downturned mouth) as a clue to the patient's unhappiness or sadness, or possibly even as a potential clue concerning a more comprehensive construct-namely, a depressive syndrome.
Thus, we would emphasize that one should make a good, but imperfect, inference that schizophrenics' disordered speech often reflects their disordered thinking. Viewing disordered schizophrenic talk as usually reflecting their disordered thinking, and as part of their impaired conceptual-linguistic activity, is useful as an approach to scientific inquiry, and useful as a way of viewing schizophrenic psychopathology. It uses a behavioral index, disordered speech, to make inferences about one aspect of the schizophrenic patient's underlying psychopathology-his disordered thinking.
